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 Board Interlocks and Earnings Management Contagion 
 
Abstract 
We examine whether earnings management spreads from firm to firm via board 
connections of shared directors. A firm has a higher likelihood of restating earnings in a given 
year if it shares a director with another firm that restated earnings either in that same year or 
within the past two years. We also find evidence of earning management contagion at the earlier 
restating period when the accounting violated GAAP. In this case, a firm has a higher probability 
of later restating earnings reported in the current year if it shares a director with other firms that 
have to restate earnings for the current or past two years. Furthermore, we find that earnings 
management contagion is stronger when it’s the shared director has a more important relevant 
position. A board chairman, audit committee member or especially audit committee chairman 
who is also a director at another firm is associated with stronger contagion relative to other board 
positions of shared directors. This finding is consistent with the importance of the role of board 
monitoring to ensure high quality financial reporting. Board network contagion effects are not 
due to reverse causality, endogenous matching of firm characteristics or common industry 
shocks, but are weakened by endogenous matching of director characteristics. Board network 
contagion effects also subsume contagion from geographical proximity of firms, and are 
incremental to other sources of earnings management incentives, such as M&A and new issue 
activities. Overall, the evidence supports the idea that economic behaviors such as earnings 
manipulation spread through social networks. 
 
JEL Classification: M40; M41; M49; G34; G39; D83 
Keywords: Earnings Management, Restatements, Board Interlocks, Social Networks, Contagion 
 Board interlocks and earnings management contagion 
“He that lies with dogs, shall rise up with fleas.” ---Benjamin Franklin 
 
1. Introduction 
 Theoretical research on social influence has examined how information and behaviors are 
transmitted from individual to individual (e.g., Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani et al. 1992). A 
growing body of research on social networks examines how social linkages affect the spread of 
behaviors and social outcomes. 
 Behaviors can spread for several reasons. Rational observers may follow the behavior of 
others based on either direct communication of the rationale for the chosen action, or through 
observation of the action. In either case, rational Bayesian updating leads to similar behavior. 
Observers may also imitate because of a preference to conform, or because of excessive 
deference to the judgment of a high-prestige model.  
 On the empirical side, recent research has documented that several types of corporate 
behaviors such as mergers & acquisitions, compensation practices, poison pill adoption, and 
stock exchange listing decisions spread through networks of interlocking boards (see note 2). 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2009) suggest that financial reporting practices (earnings management 
included) may be infectious in social networks. Srinivasan (2005) provides evidence that a 
restatement of earnings by one member firm in a network of firms with interlocking boards 
contaminates the stock values of other firms in the network.  
 In this study, we test empirically whether financial reporting behaviors, specifically 
earnings management, are propagated through interlocking corporate boards. This is similar to 
studying virus contagion using flu outbreaks to indicate the presence of viral agents.  A board 
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 link exists when an individual sits on the board of more than one firm. A typical firm in our 
sample has nine members on its board of directors and the median number of links a board has to 
other boards is about 5 (see Table 1). We rely on restatements of financial reports to indicate the 
presence of earnings management.  
 We conduct tests of contagion via board links tainted by exposure to restating firms at 
two different periods relative to a restatement event. First, we consider board links at the time of 
the restatement itself and test whether restatements are contagious. For these tests, the 
restatement event is the virus. We examine the relation between the likelihood that a firm restates 
its financial statements within two years of having an interlocked director with another firm that 
restated earnings. We find that a board link to a firm with a recent restatement significantly 
increases the likelihood that the firm will restate its own earnings by an odds ratio of 48%. The 
marginal effect of having a board link to a recent restatement firm is 27% of the unconditional 
probability that a firm restates its earnings.  
Second, we consider contagion in earnings management at the time when earnings are 
being manipulated prior to restatement. We examine whether a firm is more likely to manipulate 
financial reports if it has a common board member with a manipulating firm. The later 
restatement is an indicator that the accounting reporting choices in this period violated GAAP. 
We refer to this earlier period as the manipulation period; we test the effect of board links during 
this period. The advantage of studying contagion in this period is that we can distinguish 
contagion of earnings management from contagion of other information related to the 
announcement of the restatement. For example, a restatement if often accompanied with director 
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 turnovers, and so the board directors who are present at the time of the restatement may be 
different from those during the manipulation period.1 
We find that a board link to a firm that is currently managing earnings that later needed to 
be restated also significantly increases the likelihood that the firm manages its own earnings that 
later also needed to be restated. The contagion effect is large. The odds ratio from the regression 
suggests that a board link to a manipulator doubles the firm’s likelihood of being an earnings 
manipulator. In contrast, a board link to a firm that is not a manipulator significantly decreases 
the likelihood of the firm being a manipulator. In other words, there is both positive and negative 
financial reporting contagion. 
Just as some virus vectors are more effective than others, we also consider whether the 
board position in the test firm of the interlocked director that is shared with a firm that is 
manipulating earnings affects the intensity of earnings management contagion. We differentiate 
board links by whether the board director is the CEO, board chairman, audit committee member, 
or audit committee chairman. We find the earnings management contagion is stronger for the 
latter three positions, but not for the CEO. Board chair and audit committee positions generally 
exert a greater influence over the firm’s financial reporting decisions than other board positions, 
and can constrain the CEO from her desire to manipulate earnings. The evidence suggests that 
board supervision of management is important to ensure high quality financial reporting.  
There are several potential mechanisms by which contagion operates. A board member 
sitting on a ‘tainted’ board that later restated earnings may learn about how to manage earnings. 
When businesses are complex, there is gray area for what is acceptable under GAAP versus 
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1 Srinivasan (2005) documents that the outside directors of restating firms are more likely to lose not just their board 
position in the restating firm but also their board positions in other firms. 
 
 deceptive financial reporting that violates GAAP. This is especially so in an equilibrium where a 
firm that declines to manage earnings and fails to meet analysts’ benchmark may be sharply 
devalued by the stock market because investors expect and discount for earnings management 
when valuing the firm. A board member of a tainted firm may learn about either the social norm 
or the auditor’s cutoff for deceptive financial reporting. This information can encourage more 
earnings management in the linked firm. Alternatively, it may be that the similar financial 
reporting choice is the outcome of similar characteristics of linked firms or similar characteristics 
of directors of linked firms. For example, a director on two boards may be a lax monitor, 
encouraging earnings management at both. Furthermore, managers who wish to manage earnings 
may choose directors who are lax monitors, or who have a more aggressive or optimistic outlook 
about firm prospects.  
To ascertain whether the estimated board contagion is driven by director characteristics, 
and/or by endogenous matching of board members and firms, we conduct several additional 
analyses. First, we examine financial reporting contagion in situations where the director 
migrated to the test firm after serving on a firm that began to manipulate earnings. If such a 
director has a fixed characteristic that promotes earnings management, then we should observe a 
stronger apparent contagion effect when the migrated director is present. For example, this 
should occur if firms that want to manipulate earnings intentionally recruit such directors.  
However, we find no evidence that migrated directors increase earnings management contagion.  
Second, if companies with intentions to manage earnings choose certain types of 
directors (lax directors or directors who know earnings management), we expect to observe the 
stronger earnings management in firms with newly hired tainted directors. We find no support 
that the presence of new tainted directors increases the contagion effect.  
4 
 
 Third, if firms and directors are matched together endogenously, the timing of when the 
test firm is exposed to bad accounting practices through board links should be irrelevant. In our 
test, we find the timing is relevant to the contagion effect, thereby ruling out the endogenous firm 
and endogenous director matching explanation.  
Finally, we find that the contagion effect is not confined to board links within the same 
industry. There is significant cross-industry earnings management contagion. Therefore, the 
contagion effect from common industry accounting practices can’t explain our findings. 
 These results contribute to the accounting and social network literature by demonstrating 
that earnings management behavior is transmitted from one firm to another through board 
interlocks. Most previous studies on earnings management treat earnings management behavior 
as firm-specific, while Granovetter (1985) suggests that economic choices more generally are 
embedded in social networks such as board interlocks. Our study expands earnings management 
research into social network settings.  
This paper is also related to the accounting literature on the influence of geography on 
accounting behavior (e.g., Kedia and Rajgopal 2008a; Defond et al. 2009). The key difference is 
that we consider board interlocked members instead of geographic proximity as a specific 
conduit for behavior propagation in the network.  We compare contagion via board links versus 
via geographical proximity in our tests. We find insignificant geographical contagion and the 
board contagion effect remains after controlling for geographical proximity. This suggests that 
previous findings of geographical effects may derive from board interlocks.  
Finally, this paper also contributes to the corporate governance literature by evaluating 
whether firm monitoring is influenced by social networks within interlocked boards. Our 
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 findings suggest that to improve financial reporting quality, regulators also need to pay attention 
to the board connectivity of companies.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes related 
research in more depth and discusses our predictions on how board links to restating firms affect 
earnings quality and the propensity of earnings management. Section 3 discusses the research 
design and the sample. Section 4 presents our results and Section 5 concludes our paper. 
 
2. Literature and predictions 
We use restatements to identify previous earnings management because restatements are 
clear indicators of GAAP violations (Palmrose and Scholz 2004); other earnings management 
proxies such as discretionary accruals are statistical measures and their meaning is debated in the 
literature. Previous studies show that the disclosures of earnings restatement are related to large 
declines in market value. For example, Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz (2004) report a -9.2% 
of market return loss over a two-day (0, 1) of restatement announcement period, and Hribar and 
Jenkins (2004) find that the cost of capital rises after restatements. Moreover, Gleason et al. 
(2008) explore the industry contagion effect of earning restatements from the investor’s 
perspective, and find that when a firm restates, peer firms in the same industry also experience 
stock price declines.  
Existing studies on earnings management primarily focus on effects on the firm itself and 
do not usually examine its effect on other firms. However, behaviors are embedded in social 
networks, and executives’ corporate decisions may be influenced by other companies through 
social network ties via board interlocks (Granovetter 1985).  A growing set of studies provide 
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 evidence that firms’ corporate actions are significantly affected by other companies through 
social networks (see, e.g., the reviews of Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2009, 2003).  
Kedia and Rajgopal’s (2008a) study of geographical network effects on restatements find 
that neighboring firms’ misreporting of accounting increases a firm’s tendency to misreport 
financial restatements, and that a firm’s distance to the SEC offices is negatively associated with 
the likelihood of misreporting. DeFond et al. (2009) find that the geography of SEC enforcement 
is a key factor influencing auditor independence. Specifically, non-Big 4 auditors are less likely 
to issue going concern audit opinions when the auditor’s engagement office is located farther 
from SEC offices, while Big 4 auditors have the opposite correlation. This result suggests that 
Big 4 auditors, with reputations to protect, monitor for misreporting more carefully. Another 
study on geographical networks considers its effect on the granting of stock options. Kedia and 
Rajgopal (2008b) report that the stock option granting practices of a firm are largely shaped by 
neighboring companies’ practices, possibly in response to competitive pressure from a local 
labor market where individuals within the social network share information about compensation 
practices. 
Among publicly traded companies, boards of directors supervise and monitor the 
operation of the companies, and approve important management decisions. Directors in America 
commonly sit on more than one board, and each board meets several times a year---sometimes 
frequently, as in the case of Citibank whose board met 16 times in 2002. These interlocking 
boards form a social network in which board members can carry knowledge and corporate 
practices (good or bad) from one company to another regardless of location. Directors who serve 
on interlocking boards, therefore, are much like agents carrying infectious viruses from one firm 
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 to another. Therefore, the board network of interlocked directors can be an effective channel for 
transmitting corporate practices.  
There have been a large number of papers in the finance literature that have tested for 
potential behavior contagion via board networks across firms in a wide range of firm activities 
such as investment, mergers and acquisitions, option backdating, adoption of antitakeover 
devices such as poison pills, going private transactions, and exchange listings.2 The evidence in 
these papers generally identify higher correlation in behaviors of firms when they share common 
directors. None of the papers mentioned in note (2) specifically consider contagion of accounting 
financial reporting behaviors.  
Other studies focus on within firm networks. Hwang and Kim (2010) focus on the social 
ties between CEO and audit committee board members, and find that that increased social ties 
within the firm facilitate earnings management and higher CEO bonuses. Fracassi and Tate 
(2009) find that firms with greater social ties between the CEO and the own firm’s directors have 
fewer voluntary restatements (and more value destroying acquisitions, and have lower valuations. 
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2 Fracassi (2009) finds that a pair of firms with greater social ties between its board and management tends to have 
more similar investment and corporate finance policies. Stuart and Yim (2010) find that a company is more likely to 
receive private equity offers if its directors have private equity deal experience at the other firms where they are also 
directors. Davis (1991) finds that a company is more likely to adopt poison pills, an anti-takeover device, if the 
company is linked to the companies that have adopted poison pills through board interlocks. Haunschild finds that 
firms that are linked to acquisitive firms tend to become more acquisitive. Rao et al. (2000) find that the NASDAQ 
firms are more likely to migrate to the NYSE later on when their directors served on the boards of prior migrating 
companies; this migrating effect was weakened by board links to NASDAQ companies and strengthened by board 
links to NYSE companies. Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby (2009) report that firms interlocked with backdating firms 
are more likely to backdate employee stock options.  
Past studies also have shown that board networks affect firm performance. Cai and Sevilir (2009) find that 
greater board connections between acquirers and targets increase acquirer announcement returns and lower takeover 
premiums. However, Ishii and Xuan (2010) find that alumni ties between acquirers’ board members/executives and 
target firm board directors/executives lead to poor mergers and acquisition decisions. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 
(2008) find that strong school ties among mutual fund portfolio managers and among board members of companies 
lead to improved performance especially during corporate news events, suggesting that these social networks 
facilitate the communication of information.  
 
 
 They infer that social ties within boards reduce effective board monitoring.3 Our paper focuses 
on contagion of earnings management behaviors and restatements via interlocked directors in 
board networks across firms, not within firms.  
 Within the psychology literature, there is evidence of contagion of unethical behaviors 
(Gino, Ayal, and Ariely 2009). Sah (1991) points out that exposure to the dishonesty of others 
could lead managers to change their subjective estimate of manipulation costs and benefits. The 
social psychology literature also suggests that individuals in groups tend to conform to social 
norms even when the social norms are clearly incorrect (Asch 1951). The evidence on the higher 
frequency of stock option backdating in board interlocked firms mentioned earlier (Bizjak et al. 
2009) is consistent with this effect. Fich and Shivdasani (2007) find that firms are more likely to 
face a financial lawsuit if they have a board member who sits on the board of another firm that 
has previously been sued for fraud.  
Earnings management in firms is unlikely to be publicized widely by the firm and its 
directors, for obvious reasons. However, this behavior may diffuse quietly from one firm to 
another through individual conversations between directors, some of whom serve on multiple 
boards. Whether or not a firm manages its earnings depends on the subjective perceived cost and 
benefit of such management. For example, when a company manipulates its earnings, directors 
linked to the manipulating firm observe such behavior through board interlocks are likely to 
estimate a lower perceived cost of manipulation and a higher perceived benefit. This can lead to 
rational herd behavior or information cascades.  
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3 Other studies on CEO connectedness with either other firms or with members of its own board on CEO 
compensation are Engelberg, Gao, and Parson (2009), Horton, Millo, and Serafeim (2009), and Larcker et al. 
(2007). 
 
  Furthermore, board connections to firms that manage earnings can change the directors 
and managers’ view of whether managing earnings is a social norm, and therefore can affect the 
preferences of directors and executives. The use of earnings management at other firms can be 
viewed as a moral justification for its use by others. It can also convey information about what 
limits on aggressive accounting is permitted by auditors. In sum, direct communication of 
information signals, observation of actions and preference interactions through social networks 
via board interlocks can all cause behaviors such as earnings management to spread from one 
firm to another.   
 Overall, based on the discussion above, we hypothesize that the likelihood of earnings 
management for a firm is greater when it has a director who has served on the board of another 
firm that previously managed earnings. We discuss the research design to test this hypothesis 
next. It is important in tests of contagion to address the issue of independent common causation 
(a shared director is the cause of the behavior in both firms, without any contagion across firms) 
or endogeneity (firms that engage in certain behaviors tend to hire the same directors). One of 
the distinctive features of our paper is that it performs tests to address the possibilities of 
common caustion and endogenity.  
 
3. Research design and data 
To test whether there is contagion in accounting reporting choices between board-linked 
firms, we start with a sample of restatements. Restating firms have clearly violated Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in the period leading up to the restatement date. We 
consider the directors of such firms as infectious agents for earnings management. The general 
theme for the empirical tests examine whether the firms that are linked via common directors 
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 with the infectious firms also tend to manage earnings. We discuss the two alternative event 
periods when board links are present below.  
 We begin with an initial sample of restatement firms from the General 
Accounting/Government Accountability Office (GAO) released on Oct 4, 2002 that identify 
whether a firm restated its financial reports from 1997 to June 2002. The GAO sample is widely 
used by recent studies on earnings management (e.g., Badertscher et al. 2009). For each 
restatement firm in the sample, we identify the members of its board of directors during the 
restatement year, and trace them to linked firms on whose board these members also sit. To 
identify these board links, we use information about directors from the database from Risk 
Metrics, formerly the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) database.  
 In the rest of this section, we describe how the test variables are calculated and the test 
method for contagion effects.  The summary of the definition and calculation of all variables are 
in the Appendix. 
 
3.1  Contagion at the time of the restatement event  
We call a firm ‘infected’ if it possesses the behavior in question (e.g. in this subsection, a 
restatement) and we call a firm ‘susceptible’ if we are testing whether it will acquire the behavior. 
We are testing whether the behavior from the infected firm (the sender) will be transferred to a 
susceptible firm (the receiver). In this subsection, we measure contagion links between an 
infected firm and a susceptible firm that share directors at the time of a restatement. The 
indicator variable RESTATELINK for a susceptible firm is equal to 1 when its director sits on the 
board of an infected firm at the time the infected firm announces a restatement. To allow for an 
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 incubation period for the restatement infection to develop, we also consider the susceptible firm 
as linked if the susceptible firm shares a director with a restating firm within the past two years.  
Just as with the spread of disease, there is a higher rate of infection if a person is exposed 
to a greater number of infecteds. Therefore, the second non-binary discrete measure 
#RESTATELINK is the number of distinct restating firms that the susceptible firm has common 
directors with.  
Since some boards are very large and so are more likely to have board interlocks, we also 
apply a measure of the connectedness of the susceptible firm’s board to other firms generally. 
The variable #BOARDLINK is the number of links the firm’s board has to other boards 
regardless of whether the linked firms have a restatement or not. This measure picks up other 
contagion effects via board networks that are unrelated to restatements. In contrast to the 
restatement link that identifies bad accounting contaminant, the board link picks up contagion of 
relatively good accounting  
The dependent variable is whether a susceptible firm restates its financial statements. If 
there is a restatement, the indicator variable RESTATE equals 1 for the firm, and is zero 
otherwise. The motivation for examining restatements is that it is a clear indicator that the firm 
had manipulated its earnings at some time in the past.  
 To test for restatement contagion, we run the following cross-sectional pooled logistic 
regressions:4   
 Logit (RESTATE) = F(β0 + β1RESTATELINK + β2#BOARDLINK + ∑βj Controlsj + Year Fixed 
Effects + Industry Fixed Effects +ε) ……………………………………….……………………(1) 
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4 We also use the probit models to run all the regressions in the paper and obtain similar results. 
 
 Logit (RESTATE) = F(β0 + β1#RESTATELINK + β2#BOARDLINK + ∑βj Controlsj + Year Fixed 
Effects + Industry Fixed Effects +ε) …………………………………….………………………..(2) 
The key variables of interest are the indicator variable RESTATELINK in equation (1), or 
the continuous measure reflecting the strength of the restatement link #RESTATELINK in 
equation (2).  The control variables are described in Section 3.4. If contagion via board 
membership exists, we predict that the coefficients β1 on these variables will be positive. A 
susceptible firm with board members who also serve on boards of infected firms within the past 
two years is more likely to be infected (restate its own financial statements).   
Additionally, the estimated coefficient on the variable #BOARDLINK carries an 
interesting implication that is also new to the literature. A significant negative coefficient would 
suggest that a firm whose board of directors is linked to other firms that did not restate earnings 
is less likely to have to restate its own earnings. In other words, there is contagion of positive 
accounting reporting practice. 
 
3.2  Contagion in the earnings manipulation period preceding restatements 
The restatement tests discussed in Section 3.1 have the advantage that they permit the use 
of the full sample of firms whose earnings were eventually restated. However, they are subject to 
the objection that the information transmitted via the RESTATELINK may not be solely about 
earnings management. A restatement also conveys information about the limits that regulators 
and auditors use to determine GAAP violation in addition to information that earnings were 
previously managed. Restatements occur only after firms have managed earnings, and the board 
directors present when earnings were managed may no longer be present at the time of the 
restatement event (Srinivasan 2005).   
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 We therefore consider an alternative identification strategy for board links to focus 
specifically on contagion during the earnings manipulation period. This more accurately tests for 
contagion about information concerning the technology for managing earnings or norms about 
earnings management behavior. In these tests, we trace the restatement event back to the initial 
period when the accounting choices in that period violated GAAP to examine contagion 
occurring during this manipulation period.5  
We hand-collect information about when restating companies begin to manage earnings. 
Starting with the GAO sample of restatements from 1/1/1997 to 6/30/2002, we collect news 
articles or press releases from LexisNexis within two days of the GAO restatement 
announcement date. We read each article to identify the starting period of earnings manipulation 
related to the restatement. If this information is not available, we search the SEC EDGAR system 
for related Form 10K or 10Q of restating companies subsequent to restatement announcement 
dates, and read these documents to determine the manipulation period.  
We ascertain whether a board link to an infected firm at this initial bad accounting period 
exists using the Risk Metrics database. The indicator variable EMLINK equals 1 if the 
susceptible firm has a common board member that sits on another firm at the time that the linked 
firm began manipulating earnings in the current year or in the past two years to allow for an 
incubation period for infection. (In other words, the linked firm had to restate earnings and the 
start of the restating period is the current year or the past two years.) The non-indicator discrete 
measure #EMLINK measures the number of such links to distinct firms.   
14 
                                                 
5 The two-year incubation period that is allowed for in the tests based on the announcement of a restatement is likely 
to cover the period when earnings were manipulated but is less accurate at pinpointing the manipulation period than 
the alternative design.  
 
 
 The relevant dependent variable measures the likelihood that a susceptible firm engages  
in earnings management. The indicator variable EM equals one for a susceptible firm in year t  if 
year t is the first year for which its earnings were corrected in an eventual restatement, and is 
zero otherwise.  In other words, a susceptible firm becomes infected at the time it begins to 
manipulate its earnings in year t. When a susceptible firm becomes infected in a given year, the 
firm is no longer checked for infection or counted as infected subsequently to prevent multiple 
counting of the same infection.  
Compared to the earlier test design that is focused on contagion at the time of the 
restatement announcement, we lose 79 observations because the initial earnings manipulation 
period cannot be found or it falls earlier than 1996 when Risk Metrics coverage of director 
information begins; this reduces the power of the test.6 The sharper identification of the 
manipulation period, however, may increase test power.   
To test for contagion of earnings management in the initial manipulation period, we run 
the following cross-sectional pooled logistic regressions:  
Logit (EM) = F(β0+ β1EMLINK + β2#BOARDLINK + ∑βjControlsj+ Year Fixed Effects+ 
Industry Fixed Effects +ε)  …………………………………………….……………….…….(3)
 
Logit (EM) = F(β0+β1#EMLINK + β2#BOARDLINK + ∑βjControlsj+ Year Fixed Effects+ 
Industry Fixed Effects +ε)  ..………………………………….………………………………(4)
 
The key variables of interest are EMLINK and #EMLINK. A positive coefficient on these 
variables indicates that a board link to an infected firm (a firm that subsequently restated) during 
15 
                                                 
6 An earlier draft of the paper considered beginning dates for the earnings manipulation period ranging from three to 
seven years prior to the restatement year, and obtained qualitatively similar results. 
 
 the earnings management period increases the likelihood that a susceptible firm becomes 
infected, i.e., that it manages earnings to an extent that required later restatement. As before, 
#BOARDLINK tests for contagion of positive accounting reporting. 
 We further tests whether the board position of the interlocked director matters for the 
strength of the contagion. Director’s influence over the financial reporting practices of the firm 
varies with the position of the member on the board. The CEO, the board chair, and members of 
the audit committee are likely to wield greater influence than other directors on financial 
reporting issues. We therefore we include these additional indicator variables EMCEOLINK, 
EMBOARDCHAIRLINK, EMAUDITCHAIRLINK, and EMAUDITCOMLINK to represent links 
to manipulating firms by the test firm’s interlocked board member position as the CEO, board 
chair, audit committee chair, or audit committee member respectively.  
In our tests, in addition to the earnings management link variable EMLINK, we include 
one of the above board member position link variables. For example, we run the regression: 
Logit (EM) = F(β0+β1 EMLINK + β2EMCEOLINK +β3#BOARDLINK + ∑βjControlsj+ Year 
Fixed Effects+ Industry Fixed Effects +ε)  …………………….………………………………(5) 
EMCEOLINK variable is substituted by EMBOARDCHAIRLINK, EMAUDITCHAIRLINK, and 
EMAUDITCOMLINK in each successive regression. The board position link variables evaluate 
the incremental strength of the earnings management contagion effect.  
 
3.3  Control variables 
Both sets of regressions require appropriate controls for other known determinants for 
restatement or earnings management. We discuss next the set of control variables associated with 
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 earnings management and restatements from the literature (e.g., Lee et al. 2006; Lennox and 
Pittman 2010).  The details for all variables used in the paper are summarized in the Appendix. 
All the accounting and stock return data are from COMPUSTAT and CRSP respectively. All 
other databases used are noted where the relevant variables are discussed below.  
We control for firm performance with return on total assets (ROA), and a loss indicator 
variable, Loss. Size is estimated as the natural logarithm of total assets. Large firms are more 
visible and therefore politically more vulnerable to regulators wishing to send a message of 
intolerance for earnings manipulation to the capital markets. Growth effects are controlled using 
Market to Book, the firm’s equity market-to-book ratio. High growth firms may be tempted to 
manage earnings to sustain the perception of high growth when actual growth has slowed. High 
growth firms may also be less understood by investors and so may more be able to get away with 
earnings manipulation.  
Firm reporting quality is affected by the length of the operating cycle, measured as the 
sum of the number of days that accounts receivables and inventories are held. We use 360 days 
divided by the relevant turnover ratios to measure days held, and the natural log of the operating 
cycle (Log Operating Cycle) as the control variable. Off balance sheet activities can be used to 
reduce reported liability and inflate earnings (e.g., Dechow et al. 2010; Ge 2006).  Therefore, we 
follow Ge (2006) and construct Operating Lease, which is equal to 1, if the company’s future 
operational lease obligations are greater than zero. In addition, we include a non-financial 
indicator of earnings management, Abnormal Employee, in the regressions to complement the 
limitation of financial measures for the earnings management tendency (Brazel et al. 2009).  
Firms facing higher operating risks and the likelihood of failure have greater incentives to 
manage earnings. So, we further control for operating risks using Ret Volatility, measured as the 
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 standard deviation of the stock returns in the fiscal year. The variable Leverage is measured as 
the ratio total liabilities to total assets and controls for higher risk of firm failure and higher 
incentive to manage earnings to avoid debt-related constraints imposed on management.  
 To control for other governance-related variables that may separately affect earnings 
management, we include a corporate governance score using G-index from Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003), and the fraction of institutional holdings, Inst Holdings. To isolate the effect of 
contagion from board links as conservatively as possible, we also control for other board 
characteristics that prior literature has suggested is a proxy for the strength of monitoring by the 
board. These include CEO Duality which is equal to one, if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board, and 0 otherwise, the size of the corporate board, Board Size, and the percentage of 
independent board member Pct Ind Directors. We also use the Risk Metrics and Thomson 
Financial databases to construct an anti-takeover variable and an institutional holding variable, 
both of which are likely to be related to board governance. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Summary statistics and correlations 
Panel A, Table 1 reports how the restatement sample as well as earnings management 
contagion sample are selected.  The sample size is limited by the coverage of the Risk Metrics 
database (formerly the IRRC database) and the coverage of the GAO restatement sample. The 
earliest available restatement data begins in 1997. We do not consider restatements after 2001, 
which prior literature suggests are technical restatements following SOX, rather than 
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 restatements because of accounting irregularities. Risk Metrics’ coverage of board of directors is 
limited to the S&P top 1500 firms and about 400 other widely held firms in our sample period.  
Our sample consists of 179 restatement observations and 118 earnings management 
observations that eventually restated earnings. The small sample size is common to studies 
related to accounting fraud. For example, Erickson et al. (2006) use only 50 fraud events to 
explore the relation between executive equity incentive and accounting fraud and Lee et al. 
(2006) use 91 restatement cases to investigate the relation between earnings management and 
performance and growth.   
Combining with all non-restating firms in Risk Metrics for the 1997 to 2001 period gives 
the total sample size of 8,145 firm-year observations and 2,403 distinct firms. The number of 
observations in each regression varies with data availability for the included variables. We run 
our regressions including and excluding control variables, and results on contagion are generally 
robust to inclusion of control variables.  
Panel B, Table 1 reports the summary characteristics separately for the sample identified 
to manage earnings from later restatements (EM group) versus the sample of firm-year 
observations that did not manage earnings (Control group). These two groups are similar along 
many dimensions with several exceptions. EM firms have significantly higher EMLINK than the 
control sample. 28.8% of EM firms versus 18.7% of control firms have a board link to a firm that 
later restated earnings, so earnings manipulators have greater exposure to firms that later restated 
earnings. The number of interlocked boards, #BOARDLINK, however, is not significantly 
different between the two groups, suggesting that any differences in earnings management 
behavior is not coming from different levels of connectedness to other firms. EM firms have 
more volatile stock returns, worse performance and use more off balance sheet activities than the 
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 control sample firms consistent with these firms facing greater incentives and opportunities to 
manage earnings.  
Panel C reports the correlations among independent variables for our main tests. The high 
correlation between EMLINK and #BOARDLINK (0.429) suggests that opportunities for earnings 
management contagion increases with greater board exposure to other companies. Therefore, in 
all the regression analyses, we always control for #BOARDLINK to measure the incremental 
effect of earnings management contagion.   
 
4.2  Restatements and board interlocks 
Table 2 reports the empirical results regressing the likelihood of restating financial 
reports against board interlock variables RESTATELINK and #BOARDLINK.  In Column (1) the 
coefficient on RESTATELINK is 0.646 and positively significant at the one percent level, 
implying that a company is more likely to restate its financial reports when the company’s board 
is linked to firms that restated within the past two years. The coefficient on #BOARDLINK is 
negative but insignificant. In Column (2) and (3), we include year fixed effects and industry 
fixed effects, and find the coefficient on RESTATELINK remains positive and significant at the 
10% level. In Column (4), we control for various firm and board characteristics, and find similar 
significant results. The marginal effect for RESTATELINK is 0.64%. This constitutes 27% of the 
unconditional probability of a restatement in the sample (128 restatement observations / 5392 
total observations = 2.37%). In Column (5), we use the continuous variable for restatement board 
links to take into account the strength of the links and find similar significant results. Overall, we 
find that firms with restatement-tainted directors have high propensity to restate subsequently.  
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 4.3  Contagion during the earnings manipulation period preceding restatements 
The results in Table 3 show that there is a significant positive association between the 
likelihood that a firm begins to manipulate earnings and the firm having a director who serves on 
the board of another firm that later is identified to be a manipulator. In all the model 
specifications, the coefficient estimate on EMLINK is positive and significant at the 5% level. 
The results are robust to the use of the continuous measure #EMLINK that measures the strength 
of these manipulator board links.  
We calculate the economic significance of the board link variables in two ways using the 
multiple logistic regression in Column (4) of Table 3.  
P1 = Probability (EM=1| EMLINK=1, other controls) = 1.96% 
P2 = Probability (EM=1| EMLINK=0, other controls) = 0.98% 
This implies a marginal effect of EMLINK = 1 of 0.98%. The baseline unconditional probability 
of earnings management is 1.73% (89 observations where EM = 1 divided by 5131 total number 
of firm year observations). Therefore a board link to manipulators (EMLINK = 1) has a marginal 
affect that is 0.98/1.73 = 56% as large as the unconditional probability of managing earnings. 
Alternatively, the odds ratio [P1/(1-P1)] / [P2/(1-P2)] is 2.02, which suggests that a board link to 
a manipulator doubles the firm’s likelihood of becoming an earnings manipulator.  
  Column (5) uses the continuous measure #EMLINK to capture the intensity in earnings 
management contagion. The coefficient estimate of 0.378 is significantly positive (p value = 
0.027), with a marginal effect of 0.42%.  
Interestingly, the variable #BOARDLINK is significantly negative -0.047 (p value = 
0.079), implying that a firm with directors linked to firms with no earnings management are less 
likely to manage earnings. This is evidence that good financial reporting behaviors are also 
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 contagious. In our sample, the average number of board links to other firms is 5, and so the 
average marginal effect of 0.26% is about 62% of the marginal effect for #EMLINK. Finally, we 
also interact #BOARDLINK with EMLINK and find that the interaction variable has a significant 
negative coefficient (not reported in Table 3). This indicates that a higher number of board links 
distracts from the firm listening to the information transmitted from a manipulator firm, and so 
earnings management contagion is weaker in a larger board network. 
 
4.4  The effect of director position on contagion of earnings management 
Table 4 explores whether influential tainted directors by virtue of their position on the 
board have a disproportionate effect on the spread of earnings management across the director 
network. Among the four types of positions investigated in Table 4, we find that tainted board 
network links when the tainted board director is either the board chair, audit committee chair, or 
audit committee member significantly raises the likelihood that the firm manages earnings. The 
CEO position, however, does not have a significant incremental influence on earnings 
management contagion.  
Relative to an average board director, an audit committee member has a significant 
incremental influence, followed by an even larger influence for the board chairman, and the 
largest influence is reserved for the audit committee chairman. Compared to the marginal effect 
of EMLINK, the marginal effect of EMAUDITCOMLINK is 1.8 times larger, of 
EMBOARDCHAIRLINK is 2.4 times larger, and of EMAUDITCHAIRLINK is largest by 3.6 
times. Since the audit committee has a supervisory role specifically over financial reporting, 
these results are intuitive and consistent with the role of monitoring by the board.  
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 These results suggest that board governance matters considerably for the quality of 
financial statements, consistent with the findings from the famous Milgram (1963) experiment 
that an authority figure can induce unethical behavior in groups. Even though management is 
responsible for the financial reporting choices, the board of directors plays an important role in 
what is finally reported in the financial statements. In their role as monitors, they can acquiesce 
to or limit aggressive accounting choices. An aggressive CEO can be tamed by a forceful board 
chairman, and especially a strict audit committee chairman.  
 
4.5 Additional analyses and robustness tests 
In this subsection, we address other explanations for our findings and robustness tests for 
industry effects and other market incentives for managing earnings. One alternative explanation 
is reverse causation. A firm desiring to manage earnings may hire directors with specific 
characteristics, such as earnings management experience at other firms or a history of being a lax 
monitor to facilitate its ability to manipulate earnings. Therefore we create two indicator 
variables, one for a director who recently migrated to the susceptible firm, EMMIGRATEDLINK, 
and the other for a newly hired director, EMNEWDIRECTORLINK. The migrated director moved 
to the susceptible firm after acquiring earnings management experience from the linked firm. A 
newly hired director must be hired within the past three years but need not have moved with 
earnings management experience as long she gained the earnings management experience at 
other boards during these three years. If there is reverse causality, a firm with a migrated director 
link or a newly hired tainted director link has a higher likelihood of managing earnings.   
The result for EMMIGRATEDLINK is in Column (1) and for EMNEWDIRECTORLINK 
is in Column (2) of Table 5. Neither of these two variables’ coefficients are statistically 
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 significant, whereas EMLINK remains statistically significant in both regressions, and so the 
evidence provides no support for the reverse causation explanation.  
Another alternative explanation for our earlier findings is that the assignment of directors 
to firms is non-random and is the result of an endogenous firm or director matching. In this 
matching explanation, the positive effect of EMLINK indicates only similarities in the propensity 
to manage earnings between two firms that share a common director, and not from an 
information contagion about the earnings management technology or about norms for 
discretionary accounting reporting behaviors. In other words, “birds of the same feather flock 
together.”  
One way to view the matching explanation is as an omitted variables problem, in which a 
potentially omitted factor is anything that determines both director matching to firms and is 
correlated with susceptibility to earnings management behaviors. In our earlier tests, we have 
carefully controlled for a large set of known determinants for earnings management and 
restatements and so we have attempted to control for the matching explanation. To test between 
the matching hypothesis and the board network contagion hypothesis, we exploit the difference 
in importance between these two hypotheses about the timing of the presence of a board link and 
the infection. The board network contagion hypothesis requires that the infection develops in the 
susceptible firm after it has been exposed via a board link to an infected firm. In contrast, when a 
firm manages earnings under the matching hypothesis is invariant to when the board-linked firm 
managed earnings.  
We introduce two new indicator variables to capture time-invariant board links to 
infected firms. ENDOGENOUSFIRM equals one if the susceptible firm at any time in the sample 
period has EMLINK directors (linked to a board of an infected firm), and is zero otherwise. The 
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 ENDOGENOUSDIRECTOR indicator variable is more restrictive than the ENDOGENOUSFIRM 
variable.  It is equal to one only for the years when the tainted director who is or will have 
earnings management experience serves on the board.  The coefficients for 
ENDOGENOUSFIRM in Column (3) of Table 5 and ENDOGENOUSDIRECTOR in Column (4) 
are not statistically significant, and so there is no support for the director or firm matching 
hypotheses.  Instead, the coefficient on EMLINK remains positively significant in Column (3), 
consistent with the board network contagion hypothesis.  In Column 4, adding 
ENDOGENOUSDIRECTOR causes EMLINK to become insignificant at conventional levels, 
though the two-tailed p-value is 12% and its coefficient 0.662 is comparable to its coefficient 
0.707 in Table 3 Column (4) without the ENDOGENOUSDIRECTOR variable.   
  Finally, firms in the same industry tend to have similar accounting practices and face 
common business conditions. The contagion effect we document may be the result of these 
common factors. To address such a concern, Column (5), Table 5 shows that the results are not 
driven solely by same-industry contagion by including only EMLINK from board networks from 
different industries in the regression. 
Previous studies show that earnings management is correlated geographically (e.g., Kedia 
and Rajgopal 2008a). Table 6 explores whether our findings can be explained by the earnings 
management correlation derived from geographical proximity by constructing a variable 
GEOPROXIMITY. This variable is calculated as the sum of the reciprocal of the distance 
between test firm i and all EM = 1 firms in the same year and prior two years (i.e. ∑ 1/(1 + 
distance(i, k) where k is an EM = 1 firm). Column (1) shows that firms located close to infected 
firms tend to manipulate earnings, consistent with the findings in past studies. Column (2) and 
(3) include our variable of interest EMLINK. The results suggest that tainted board links have a 
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 robust effect on the earnings management of linked susceptible firms after additionally 
controlling for geographical proximity. Interestingly, GEOPROXIMITY is no longer significant. 
This suggests that the earnings management contagion through board interlocks may explain the 
previously documented earnings management contagion through geographical proximity.   
Previous studies have documented circumstances in which earnings management 
incentives are especially strong. We test whether earnings management contagion is incremental 
to these factors in Table 7. We control for mergers and acquisitions with M&A indicator variable 
in Column (1) (Louis 2004), issuances of new equities or debts with ISSUE indicator variable 
(e.g., Teoh et al. 1998b, 1998a) in Column (2), and the likelihood of accounting frauds using 
FSCORE (Dechow et al. 2010) in Column (3).  Column (4) further includes all these three 
variables. The results in Table 7 show that EMLINK and #BOARDLINK are robust to the 
inclusion of these further determinants of earnings management, implying that board networks 
incrementally affect both positive and negative accounting reporting behaviors.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper studies the role of board interlocks in the propagation of corporate financial 
reporting practices. We find evidence that a firm is more likely to manage its earnings when it 
has board links to other firms that are infected with earnings management, identified in two ways. 
The first is when the linked firm recently restated earnings. The second is when the linked firm is 
engaged in manipulating its accounting that later had to be restated. Both identification methods 
provide evidence of contagion of earnings management behaviors. This evidence support 
Granovetter’s (1985) argument that economic actions are influenced by social networks and 
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 contacts. More broadly, our findings suggest that social influence is important for financial 
accounting practices.  
Furthermore, we find that the more important the board position held by interlocked 
director in the susceptible firm, the stronger the contagion effect. This is particularly the case 
with board positions that have influence over financial reporting. These pieces of evidence 
suggest that board monitoring plays a key role on the contagion and quality of the firm’s 
financial reports.  
 We have focused on only a particular type of social network, board interlocks. Other 
types of social networks such as school ties, golf club memberships, and country club 
memberships may also influence financial reporting and other business decisions. Future studies 
might investigate the various types of social networks’ influence on firm activities.  
Our sample drawn from Risk Metrics mainly focuses on the large S&P 1500 companies. 
Earnings management contagion through boards of directors in small companies and private 
firms are not considered. Social networks may be even more important in small businesses and 
private firms, so further empirical study of social contagion across such firms is called for.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
The table describes the selection process and summary statistics of the sample. The sample 
consists of all firms in Risk Metrics from 1997 to 2001. Panel A provides the number of 
observations obtained at each sample selection step beginning with the GAO (2002) restatement 
sample. Panel B provides the summary statistics for two groups of the sample. In the EM sample, 
firms are identified as earnings manipulators if the earnings for that firm year had to be restated 
at a future date. The control group consists of the remaining firms in Risk Metrics not identified 
as earnings manipulators. Panel C reports correlations among all independent variables. 
Definitions of the control variables are in the Appendix. 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
 
GAO sample released on Oct 4, 2002 (1/1/1997-6/30/2002)   919
Less:   
Missing Gvkey  91
Not covered by  Risk Metrics  606
Missing Beginning EM date or outside of Risk Metrics coverage period  79
Duplicate Restatements or Multiple Restatements per year  6
Multiple Restatements per firm   19
Final Usable Restatement Sample  118
 
Panel A provides information on how the restatement sample is selected.  
 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Comparison of firm characteristics for EM sample and Control sample.  
 
  Control group EM group     
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev. N Mean Median Std Dev. 
t-statistics for 
Mean 
Difference 
Wilcoxon test for 
Median 
Difference 
EMLINK 8,027 0.187 0.000 0.39 118 0.288 0.000 0.455 (-2.40)** (-2.79)*** 
#BOARDLINK 8,027 7.422 5.000 7.595 118 7.839 6.000 7.584 (-0.59) (-1.13) 
ROA 7,930 0.026 0.037 0.111 117 0.004 0.025 0.132 (1.81)* (2.55)** 
Loss 7,948 0.186 0.000 0.389 117 0.239 0.000 0.429 (-1.33) (-1.45) 
Size 7,930 7.481 7.268 1.637 117 7.665 7.612 1.473 (-1.34) (-1.78) 
Leverage 7,902 0.584 0.595 0.229 117 0.600 0.599 0.237 (-0.73) (-0.70) 
Market to Book 7,691 3.347 2.244 3.452 112 3.362 2.338 3.074 (-0.05) (-0.10) 
Log Operating Cycle 7,699 4.855 4.725 1.059 113 4.817 4.691 0.92 (0.44) (0.01) 
Ret Volatility 7,931 3.128 2.74 1.529 117 3.598 3.151 1.638 (-3.08)*** (-3.51)*** 
Operating Lease 0/1 7,948 0.773 1.000 0.419 117 0.855 1.000 0.354 (-2.49)** (-2.11)** 
Firm Age 7,948 23.686 19.000 15.547 117 23.444 19.000 16.285 (0.16) (0.37) 
Abnormal Employee 7,617 -0.057 -0.039 0.229 114 -0.049 -0.021 0.275 (-0.31) (-1.18) 
G-index 6,863 8.958 9.000 2.762 100 9.290 9.000 2.844 (-1.16) (-1.15) 
Inst Holdings 8,019 0.153 0.134 0.123 118 0.149 0.139 0.125 (0.35) (0.47) 
Board Size 8,027 9.599 9.000 3.181 118 9.356 9.000 2.833 (0.92) (0.45) 
CEO Duality 8,027 0.670 1.000 0.47 118 0.703 1.000 0.459 (-0.79) (-0.77) 
Pct Ind directors 7,989 60.522 62.5 18.946 118 62.717 66.667 19.086 (-1.24) (-1.36) 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Panel B compare the characteristics of EM group and Control group. t-statistics are in 
parentheses for mean difference tests and z-statistics are in parentheses for median difference tests. Definitions of the control variables are described in 
Appendix. 
 
 
33 
 
 34 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Correlations 
  EMLINK (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(2) #BOARDLINK 0.429                
(3) ROA 0.008 0.045               
(4) Loss -0.017 -0.085 -0.639              
(5) Size 0.282 0.573 0.016 -0.158             
(6) Leverage 0.125 0.288 -0.230 -0.002 0.542            
(7) Market to Book 0.074 0.158 0.226 -0.089 0.061 0.027           
(8) Log Operating Cycle 0.043 0.075 -0.100 -0.030 0.311 0.306 -0.020          
(9) Ret Volatility -0.057 -0.239 -0.334 0.415 -0.324 -0.252 0.047 -0.046         
(10) Operating Lease (0/1) 0.022 0.010 -0.002 0.127 -0.228 -0.238 0.080 -0.229 0.291        
(11) Firm Age 0.169 0.393 0.075 -0.117 0.320 0.224 -0.046 0.005 -0.429 -0.234       
(12) Abnormal Employee -0.024 0.002 -0.078 0.037 -0.064 -0.003 -0.069 0.007 -0.026 -0.013 0.013      
(13) G-index 0.081 0.240 0.028 -0.070 0.169 0.196 -0.044 0.046 -0.220 -0.086 0.362 -0.004     
(14) Inst Holdings -0.065 -0.114 -0.078 0.112 -0.253 -0.071 -0.116 -0.096 0.124 0.242 -0.163 0.024 -0.092    
(15) Board Size 0.202 0.502 0.024 -0.147 0.584 0.405 0.023 0.296 -0.367 -0.270 0.342 -0.012 0.224 -0.244   
(16) CEO Duality 0.068 0.161 0.005 -0.045 0.149 0.110 0.011 0.039 -0.097 -0.035 0.122 0.004 0.111 -0.029 0.058  
(17) Pct Ind Directors 0.149 0.335 -0.026 -0.039 0.182 0.183 -0.012 0.059 -0.131 -0.133 0.274 -0.002 0.280 -0.017 0.134 0.142 
Correlation figures are bold-faced if they are significant at the 5% level. Panel C reports correlations among all independent variables. Definitions of the 
control variables are described in Appendix. 
 
 
 Table 2: Propensity of restatements on board links to restating firms 
The table presents results of logistic regressions of RESTATE on RESTATELINK or #RESTATELINK 
based on Equations (1) or (2) in the paper. RESTATE equals one if there is a restatement for a firm-year 
observation, and is zero otherwise. RESTATELINK equals one when a board member is linked a 
restatement firm within the two past years, and is zero otherwise. #RESTATELINK is measured as the 
number of board interlocks with other distinct restating firms. Definitions of the control variables are in 
Appendix. Robust p values are in parentheses. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** 
significant at 1% level. 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
#RESTATELINK         0.226* 
          (0.052) 
RESTATELINK 0.646*** 0.354* 0.364* 0.392*  
  (0.001) (0.100) (0.087) (0.095)  
#BOARDLINK -0.004 0.005 0.009 -0.010 -0.013 
  (0.730) (0.710) (0.503) (0.632) (0.541) 
ROA       -0.181 -0.229 
        (0.877) (0.843) 
Loss       0.417 0.416 
        (0.142) (0.145) 
Size       0.291*** 0.295*** 
        (0.002) (0.002) 
Leverage       1.469** 1.442** 
        (0.025) (0.026) 
Market to Book       -0.036 -0.034 
        (0.196) (0.220) 
Log operating cycle       -0.209 -0.214 
        (0.123) (0.116) 
Ret Volatility       0.267*** 0.265*** 
        (0.003) (0.003) 
Operating Lease 0/1       0.617 0.601 
        (0.112) (0.119) 
Firm Age       -0.003 -0.002 
        (0.738) (0.804) 
Abnormal Employee       -0.359 -0.353 
        (0.327) (0.333) 
G-index       0.073* 0.073* 
        (0.053) (0.050) 
Inst Holdings       0.744 0.767 
        (0.352) (0.338) 
Board Size       -0.046 -0.047 
        (0.298) (0.288) 
CEO Duality       0.234 0.232 
        (0.262) (0.267) 
Pct Ind Directors       -0.004 -0.003 
        (0.551) (0.569) 
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,042 8,042 7,192 5,392 5,392 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.007 0.023 0.047 0.100 0.100 
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 Table 3: Propensity to manage earnings on board links to earnings manipulators 
The table presents results of logistic regressions of EM on EMLINK or #EMLINK based on Equations (3) 
or (4). EM equals one if this is the initial year of the restating period for a firm that later had to restate its 
earnings, and is zero otherwise. EMLINK equals one when a firm has an interlocked board member with 
another firm whose earnings in that period or two years prior were managed and had to be restated at a 
future date, and is zero otherwise. # EMLINK is measured as the number of board interlocks with other 
distinct earnings manipulators. Definitions of all variables are in the Appendix. Robust p values are in 
parentheses. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
# EMLINK     0.378** 
     (0.027) 
EMLINK 0.636** 0.593** 0.592** 0.707**  
 (0.013) (0.024) (0.025) (0.015)  
#BOARDLINK -0.009 -0.009 -0.004 -0.046* -0.047* 
 (0.547) (0.537) (0.808) (0.071) (0.079) 
ROA    -0.686 -0.710 
    (0.589) (0.572) 
Loss    -0.004 0.010 
    (0.993) (0.980) 
Size    0.442*** 0.447*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage    0.833 0.818 
    (0.305) (0.309) 
Market to Book    -0.055* -0.052 
    (0.089) (0.111) 
Log operating cycle    0.019 0.025 
    (0.920) (0.893) 
Ret Volatility    0.147 0.143 
    (0.173) (0.185) 
Operating Lease (0/1)    0.881* 0.866** 
    (0.051) (0.050) 
Firm Age    -0.012 -0.012 
    (0.178) (0.180) 
Abnormal Employee    -0.130 -0.143 
    (0.798) (0.778) 
G-index    0.075* 0.078* 
    (0.096) (0.084) 
Inst Holdings    0.274 0.314 
    (0.777) (0.747) 
Board Size    -0.031 -0.030 
    (0.599) (0.612) 
CEO Duality    0.119 0.118 
    (0.632) (0.633) 
Pct Ind Directors    0.004 0.004 
    (0.602) (0.570) 
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,077 8,077 7,004 5,131 5,131 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.006 0.016 0.036 0.074 0.071 
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 Table 4: Propensity to manage earnings and board links to earnings manipulators 
depending on directors’ board position. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EMLINK 0.618** 0.561* 0.569* 0.398 
 (0.036) (0.061) (0.068) (0.298) 
EMCEOLINK 0.641    
 (0.221)    
EMBOARDCHAIRLINK  0.970**   
  (0.050)   
EMAUDITCHAIRLINK   1.279**  
   (0.016)  
EMAUDITCOMLINK    0.631* 
    (0.098) 
#BOARDLINK -0.046* -0.046* -0.044* -0.047* 
 (0.074) (0.072) (0.080) (0.064) 
ROA -0.607 -0.565 -0.452 -0.674 
 (0.635) (0.657) (0.729) (0.594) 
Loss 0.012 0.007 0.032 0.013 
 (0.976) (0.985) (0.934) (0.974) 
Size 0.447*** 0.451*** 0.447*** 0.446*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.832 0.870 0.882 0.830 
 (0.303) (0.281) (0.277) (0.307) 
Market to Book -0.054* -0.053 -0.056* -0.056* 
 (0.092) (0.101) (0.086) (0.084) 
Log operating cycle 0.013 0.019 0.040 0.029 
 (0.943) (0.920) (0.831) (0.877) 
Ret Volatility 0.146 0.148 0.152 0.151 
 (0.175) (0.169) (0.167) (0.165) 
Operating Lease (0/1) 0.903** 0.880** 0.866* 0.840* 
 (0.039) (0.049) (0.057) (0.065) 
Firm Age -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 
 (0.169) (0.182) (0.188) (0.142) 
Abnormal Employee -0.125 -0.094 -0.124 -0.108 
 (0.807) (0.854) (0.808) (0.832) 
G-index 0.076* 0.079* 0.074 0.074* 
 (0.091) (0.079) (0.100) (0.100) 
Inst Holdings 0.336 0.395 0.293 0.334 
 (0.731) (0.684) (0.766) (0.731) 
Board Size -0.032 -0.032 -0.034 -0.025 
 (0.577) (0.580) (0.568) (0.673) 
CEO Duality 0.109 0.096 0.105 0.123 
 (0.660) (0.699) (0.669) (0.619) 
Pct Ind Directors 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 
 (0.590) (0.587) (0.634) (0.594) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,131 5,131 5,131 5,131 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.075 0.077 0.079 0.076 
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 Table 4 (Continued) 
 
The table reports results of logistic regressions of EM on EMLINK and one of the board member 
influence or position variables from the list EMCEOLINK, EMBOARDCHAIRLINK, 
EMAUDITCHAIRLINK and EMAUDITCOMLINK respectively, see example in Equation (5) in 
the paper. EM and EMLINK are as described in Table 3. EMCEOLINK equals one when the 
firm’s EMLINK is via a director who is the CEO of the test firm, and is zero otherwise. 
EMBOARDCHAIRLINK equals one if a firm’s EMLINK is via a director who is the chairman of 
the board, and is zero otherwise. EMAUDITCHAIRLINK equals one if a firm’s EMLINK is via a 
director who is the chairman of the audit committee, and is zero otherwise. 
EMADUITCOMLINK equals one if a firm’s EMLINK is via a director who is an audit committee 
member. Definitions of the control variables are described in Appendix. Robust p values in 
parentheses. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
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 Table 5: Propensity to manage earnings and board links to earnings manipulators by 
migrated or newly hired directors, and time invariant/cross-industry board links. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EMLINK 0.678** 0.741** 0.615* 0.662  
 (0.025) (0.017) (0.090) (0.122)  
EMMIGRATEDLINK 0.252     
 (0.643)     
EMNEWDIRECTOR  -0.111    
  (0.786)    
ENDOGENOUSFIRM   0.130   
   (0.686)   
ENDOGENOUSFIRMDIRECTOR    0.056  
    (0.892)  
EMLINK - Different Ind. Only     0.565* 
     (0.062) 
#BOARDLINK -0.046* -0.045* -0.046* -0.046* -0.040 
 (0.070) (0.075) (0.064) (0.069) (0.102) 
ROA -0.718 -0.666 -0.695 -0.688 -0.646 
 (0.568) (0.600) (0.585) (0.588) (0.611) 
Loss -0.010 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.005 
 (0.980) (0.999) (0.996) (0.994) (0.991) 
Size 0.443*** 0.442*** 0.438*** 0.442*** 0.448*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.842 0.832 0.832 0.834 0.848 
 (0.301) (0.305) (0.306) (0.305) (0.290) 
Market to Book -0.055* -0.055* -0.055* -0.055* -0.053* 
 (0.087) (0.091) (0.086) (0.090) (0.097) 
Log Operating Cycle 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.016 
 (0.927) (0.924) (0.919) (0.919) (0.931) 
Ret Volatility 0.147 0.147 0.145 0.147 0.150 
 (0.175) (0.174) (0.176) (0.174) (0.162) 
Operating Lease (0/1) 0.892* 0.879* 0.878* 0.880* 0.871* 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.054) 
Firm Age -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 
 (0.173) (0.177) (0.177) (0.178) (0.165) 
Abnormal Employee -0.137 -0.124 -0.131 -0.130 -0.141 
 (0.787) (0.807) (0.796) (0.798) (0.782) 
G-index 0.075* 0.076* 0.074 0.075* 0.076* 
 (0.099) (0.095) (0.101) (0.096) (0.090) 
Inst Holdings 0.249 0.276 0.256 0.269 0.303 
 (0.799) (0.776) (0.793) (0.782) (0.754) 
Board Size -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.032 
 (0.597) (0.594) (0.595) (0.599) (0.581) 
CEO Duality 0.117 0.119 0.118 0.119 0.116 
 (0.635) (0.632) (0.632) (0.630) (0.639) 
Pct Ind Directors 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.601) (0.604) (0.594) (0.603) (0.617) 
Year  & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,131 5,131 5,131 5,131 5,131 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.070 
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 Table 5 (Continued) 
 
The table reports results of logistic regressions of EM on EMLINK and one of the variables 
EMMIGRATEDLINK, EMNEWDIRECTOR, ENDOGENOUSFIRM, and 
ENDOGENOUSDIRECTOR from Column (1) to Column (4). Column (5) replaces the presence 
of tainted directors (EMLINK) with the presence of tainted directors from different industries 
(EMLINK-Different Ind. Only). EM and EMLINK are described previously in Table 3. 
EMMIGRATEDLINK equals one if the director who triggered EMLINK=1 joined the test firm 
subsequent to his earnings management (EM) experience in the linked firm. EMNEWDIRECTOR 
equals one if the director joined the test firm for no more than three years, and earned earnings 
management experience from sitting on other boards at any time in the three year period. 
ENDOGENOUSFIRM equals one if the firm at some point in the sample period acquires EM-
experienced directors. ENDOGENOUSDIRECTOR equals one if a board director is EM 
experienced or will become EM experienced in the sample period.  Definitions of the control 
variables are described in Appendix. Robust p values in parentheses. * significant at 10% level; 
** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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 Table 6: Comparing earnings management contagion from geographical proximity versus 
from board interlocks. 
The table reports results of logistic regressions of EM on EMLINK and/or GEOPROXIMITY. EM and 
EMLINK are as described in Table 3. GEOPROXIMITY is the sum of the reciprocal of the distance the 
test firm and all EM=1 firms in the same year and prior two years. Definitions of the control variables are 
described in Appendix. Robust p values in parentheses. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% 
level; *** significant at 1% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
GEOPROXIMITY 0.132* 0.075 -0.026 
 (0.063) (0.315) (0.788) 
EMLINK  0.585** 0.718** 
  (0.027) (0.013) 
#BOARDLINK  -0.004 -0.046* 
  (0.793) (0.067) 
ROA   -0.713 
   (0.575) 
Loss   -0.004 
   (0.993) 
Size   0.449*** 
   (0.000) 
Leverage   0.778 
   (0.336) 
Market to Book   -0.054 
   (0.103) 
Log Operating Cycle   0.018 
   (0.926) 
Ret Volatility   0.147 
   (0.174) 
Operating Lease (0/1)   0.891** 
   (0.047) 
Firm Age   -0.013 
   (0.162) 
Abnormal Employee   -0.123 
   (0.810) 
G-index   0.076* 
   (0.093) 
Inst Holdings   0.270 
   (0.782) 
Board Size   -0.032 
   (0.581) 
CEO Duality   0.115 
   (0.640) 
Pct Ind Directors   0.004 
   (0.583) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect No Yes Yes 
Observations 8,028 6,955 5,121 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.014 0.036 0.074 
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 Table 7:  Comparing board interlock contagion and market incentives on the propensity to 
manipulate earnings. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EMLINK 0.685** 0.695** 0.689** 0.673** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.022) 
#BOARDLINK -0.041* -0.047* -0.043* -0.043* 
 (0.098) (0.063) (0.092) (0.091) 
M&A  0.640***   0.453 
 (0.010)   (0.101) 
ISSUE  0.462*  0.345 
  (0.066)  (0.173) 
FSCORE   1.685*** 1.088* 
   (0.002) (0.062) 
ROA -0.500 -0.668 -0.048 0.023 
 (0.704) (0.600) (0.973) (0.987) 
Loss 0.006 0.022 0.131 0.124 
 (0.988) (0.954) (0.744) (0.757) 
Size 0.421*** 0.431*** 0.414*** 0.406*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.897 0.709 0.991 0.830 
 (0.272) (0.393) (0.240) (0.334) 
Market to Book -0.056* -0.059* -0.069* -0.068* 
 (0.088) (0.071) (0.051) (0.056) 
Log Operating Cycle 0.064 0.038 0.036 0.074 
 (0.740) (0.838) (0.852) (0.699) 
Ret Volatility 0.151 0.134 0.112 0.111 
 (0.162) (0.216) (0.322) (0.319) 
Operating Lease (0/1) 0.831* 0.793* 0.576 0.588 
 (0.060) (0.066) (0.207) (0.181) 
Firm Age -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.237) (0.212) (0.254) (0.293) 
Abnormal Employee 0.006 -0.073 0.317 0.286 
 (0.989) (0.885) (0.518) (0.549) 
G-index 0.075 0.075* 0.075 0.075 
 (0.100) (0.099) (0.100) (0.103) 
Inst Holdings 0.307 0.230 0.378 0.372 
 (0.753) (0.815) (0.699) (0.707) 
Board Size -0.033 -0.030 -0.027 -0.028 
 (0.578) (0.609) (0.648) (0.634) 
CEO Duality 0.116 0.114 0.095 0.095 
 (0.639) (0.648) (0.703) (0.703) 
Pct Ind Directors 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 (0.594) (0.565) (0.530) (0.513) 
Year & Industry  Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,131 5,131 5,084 5,084 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.079 0.077 0.079 0.084 
 42
 Table 7 (Continued) 
 
The table reports results of logistic regressions of EM on EMLINK with additional controls of 
M&A, ISSUE and FSCORE. M&A equals one if a firm has M&A activities in the year, and is 
zero otherwise. ISSUE equals one if a firm issues new debts or equity in the year, and is zero 
otherwise. FSCORE is calculated as the propensity of accounting frauds based on the model in 
Dechow et al. (2010). EM and EMLINK are previously described in Table 3. Definitions of the 
control variables are described in Appendix. Robust p values in parentheses. * significant at 10% 
level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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 Appendix: Definitions Table 
 
Variable Name Definition  
EM 
 
Indicator variable equals 1 if this is the starting year of the restating 
period (i.e., the manipulation period) for a firm that had to restate 
earnings, and is zero otherwise.  
RESTATE 
 
Indicator variable equals 1 if firm announces restatement in the year, and 
is zero otherwise. 
EMLINK 
 
Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm shares a director with another firm 
that experienced EM = 1 either in the current year or in the past two 
years, and is zero otherwise. In other words, the linked firm is a restating 
firm and the restating period is either in the current year or in the past two 
years.  
#EMLINK 
 
Number of board links a firm has with another firm that has  EM =1 in 
the current or past two years. It is the continuous measure of the EMLINK 
variable. 
 
RESTATELINK 
 
Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm is interlocked through a shared 
director with another firm that restates earnings within the past two years. 
#RESTATELINK Number of firm restatement board interlocks. 
#BOARDLINK 
 
Number of other firms connected to the firm through interlocked board 
network. A firm is interlocked with another firm if there is a common 
director serving on board of both firms.  
ROA 
 
Return on total assets ([NI]/[AT])  Compustat labels are in [] 
Loss 
 
Indicator variable equals 1 if the firm's income before extraordinary items 
[IB] is negative in the year 
Size 
 
Natural logarithm of firm's total assets [AT] 
Leverage 
 
Total liabilities [LT] divided by total assets[AT] 
Market to Book 
 
Market to book ratio( [CSHO]*[PRCC_F]/[CEQ] ) 
 
Log Operating Cycle 
 
 
Log of operating cycle which is equal to [360/ (Sales[SALE] /Average 
AR[RECT]) + 360/(Cost of Goods Sold[COGS]) / (Average 
Inventory[INV])]. 
 
Ret Volatility 100 times stock return volatility in year t  
Operating Lease (0/1) Indicator variable equals 1 if firm’s future operating lease obligations ([MRC1],[MRC2],[MRC3],[MRC4] or [MRC5]) are greater than zero, 
and 0 otherwise 
Firm Age 
 
Firm's age 
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 Abnormal Employee 
Firm’s abnormal change in employees equals the number of employees 
[EMP] for year t minus the number of employees for year t-1, scaled by 
the number of employees for year t-1, less total assets [AT] at year-end t 
minus total assets at year-end t-1, scaled by  assets at year-end t-1. 
G-index 
 
G-Score of Gompers et al ( 2003) 
Inst Holdings 
 
Percentage of Institutional holdings 
Board Size 
 
Number of board members on firm i’s board in a given year 
 
CEO  Duality 
 
Indicator variable equals 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of Board 
Pct Ind Directors Percentage of independent board member on firm i’s board 
M&A  
 
Indicator variable equals 1if a firm has M&A activities ([AQS]>0) in the 
year 
ISSUE 
 
Indicator variable equals 1 if the sum of new long-term debt [DLTIS] 
plus new equity  [SSTK]  exceeds 2 percent of total assets [AT] for a 
firm-year. 
FSCORE 
 
Average F-score in the past three years; F-score is the propensity of 
accounting frauds, and its estimation is based on Dechow et al. (2010). 
EMCEOLINK 
 
Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm' s EMLINK is via a director who is 
the CEO of the firm 
EMBOARDCHAIRLINK 
 
Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm's EMLINK is via a director who is the 
board chairman 
EMAUDITCHAIRLINK 
 
Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm's EMLINK is via a director who is the 
chairperson of the audit committee. 
EMAUDITCOMLINK Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm' s EMLINK is via a director who is an 
audit committee member 
EMMIGRATEDLINK 
 
Indicator variable equals 1 if the director who triggered EMLINK=1 
joined test firm subsequent to his earnings management experience in the 
linked firms 
EMNEWDIRECTOR Indicator variable equals 1 if the director who triggered EMLINK=1 
joined test firm for 3 or fewer years 
ENDOGENOUSFIRM 
 
Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm at some point in time acquires a 
director from a firm that has EM = 1 (i.e. has earnings management 
experience) 
ENDOGENOUSFIRMDIRECTOR 
 
Indicator variable equals 1 for firm-years in which there is a director on 
board who either is earnings management experienced or will become 
earnings management experienced  
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  46
EMLINK - Different Ind. Only 
 
Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm's EMLINK = 1 is from a firm  in a 
different Fama-French 48 industries. That is, the tainted directors are 
from firms in a different industry.  
 
GEOPROXIMITY 
 
Sum of the reciprocal of the distance between test firm i and all EM=1 
firms k in same year and prior two years (i.e. ∑ 1/(1+distance (i,k) where 
k is each EM firm) 
 
 
 
 
